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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The international refugee regime is failing Australian national interests; 
the interests of the international community; and the interests of refugees 
themselves. But contravening international commitments is not the most 
effective way to remedy these failures, or to provide a lasting solution to 
Australia’s asylum crisis. Instead Australia should lead a reform of the 
international system for assisting and protecting refugees, which 
currently places an unreasonable burden on destination states, and has 
the perverse consequence of promoting people smuggling. 
Australia has one of the strongest track records in promoting the new 
approaches that are now required, including intervening to prevent 
atrocities, enhancing protection in regions affected by displacement, and 
combatting people smuggling. There is support for reform across the 
political spectrum in Australia, unlike in Europe. And Canberra has 
already demonstrated its willingness to reject the status quo, albeit 
controversially.  Australia should take the lead now before its credibility 
to do so disappears. 
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Australia’s signature on 22 January 1954 brought into force the 1951 UN 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. It is now time for Australia 
again to take the lead, by pressing for a review of the 1951 Convention 
and the international protection system of which it is a cornerstone. 
While the Convention itself has, by and large, stood the test of time, its 
implementation is failing: failing Australian national interests; the 
interests of the wider international community; and the interests of 
refugees themselves. Indeed, one of the primary beneficiaries of these 
failures is people smugglers. 
Australia has already demonstrated its impatience with the status quo 
and its appetite for a new paradigm. Offshore processing as currently 
enacted by the Australian Government may have served its national 
interests better than the current international protection system; but is 
still in violation of the Convention to which Australia is a signatory. The 
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 
deliberately removes most references to the 1951 Convention from the 
Migration Act 1958. And yet, in other ways, Australia continues to adhere 
to the Convention, directly through its refugee resettlement program, and 
indirectly through its ongoing support for the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). 
The Australian Government’s current approach may be working in the 
short term, but it is unlikely to diminish Australia’s asylum crisis in the 
long term, and it is damaging Australia’s international reputation. The 
Government needs to look beyond its current policies and lead an 
international debate on reforming the protection system.  
This Analysis lays out the case for reform: why it is preferable and more 
effective than the current Australian approach; how Australia is uniquely 
placed to lead an international debate on reform; and what the focus of 
that debate should be. First, it clarifies that what is required is not a 
revision of the 1951 Convention itself, but an overhaul of the way it is 
implemented through the international protection system. 
SHOULD THE 1951 CONVENTION BE REVISED? 
The UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees is the key 
international legal document relating to refugee protection. It defines who 
is a refugee and outlines the rights of refugees and the legal obligations 
of states towards refugees. It also underpins the work of UNHCR. There 
are currently 144 States Parties to the 1951 Convention and 145 to its 
1967 Protocol, with 142 States Parties to both the Convention and 
Protocol.1 
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Some commentators argue that the Convention is so dated as to no 
longer apply to the current realities of those in need of international 
protection. One point concerns the Convention’s definition of a refugee 
as a person who:  
Owing to (a) well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country.2 
This definition reflects that the Convention was drafted specifically to find 
solutions for those who had been displaced across Europe by Nazism 
and the Second World War. Hence, as originally drafted, it covered only 
those who were refugees as a result of “…events occurring before 1 
January 1951…” and focused on “…events in Europe.” These 
geographical and time constraints of the 1951 Convention were lifted by 
its 1967 Protocol, thus broadening its applicability. The definition of a 
refugee was further expanded in two regional complements to the 1951 
Convention, the 1969 OAU Convention and the 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration, to cover particular circumstances in Africa and Central 
America respectively.  
Nevertheless, significant gaps remain in the definition as it applies to 
contemporary circumstances.3 In particular, there is a growing 
consensus that over the next decade or so, the effects of environmental 
change are likely to compound other drivers of displacement, increasing 
migration pressures globally including in Australia.4 It is clear that the 
definition of a refugee provided in the 1951 Convention does not refer to 
environmental causes for flight; but that at least some people forced 
from their homes principally by the effects of environmental change will 
cross borders and require protection and assistance in ‘refugee-like’ 
situations.5 
The 1951 Convention specifies three durable solutions for refugees: to 
return to their own country voluntarily (“voluntary repatriation”); to 
integrate in the country where they find themselves (“local integration”); 
or to resettle in another country (“third country resettlement”). Its focus 
on solutions is among the Convention’s strengths, but also reflects the 
situation of the refugees for whom it was established — people who had 
already been forced from their homes. Another critique is that neither the 
Convention nor UNHCR were originally envisaged to deal with new 
refugees after solutions had been found for those displaced across 
Europe after the Second World War. 
In particular, the 1951 Convention does not refer to asylum seekers — 
although it promotes the right to asylum — and this is one of the main 
reasons why the Convention has proved so hard to implement in 
contemporary circumstances. In contrast to the already displaced 
individuals that the Convention was established to cater for, an asylum 
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seeker is someone who has left their country in search of international 
protection, but is yet to be recognised as a refugee. According to Article 
14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights everyone has “…the 
right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”6 
In other ways, though, the 1951 Convention is valid and applicable to 
current circumstances. First, it enumerates a set of rights for refugees, 
albeit relatively narrowly defined. In recognition of the fact that they have 
fled their home countries and no longer enjoy the legal protection 
afforded to citizens of a state, the Convention provides access to 
national courts for refugees, the right to employment and education, and 
a series of other social, economic, and civil rights on a par with nationals 
of the host country. The 1951 Convention also stipulates rights specific 
to refugees, including protection from penalties for illegal entry. As a 
signatory to the 1951 Convention Australia is not permitted to treat 
refugees arriving illegally differently from those arriving legally. 
Second, the Convention is underpinned by a number of fundamental 
principles, most notably non-discrimination, non-penalisation, and ‘non-
refoulement’. The last is perhaps the most significant: it refers to the right 
of refugees not to be returned to a country where they risk persecution. 
‘Non-refoulement’ remains the fundamental provision of international 
refugee protection, and is now considered a provision of customary 
international law, binding even on states not party to the 1951 
Convention.7 Third, the Convention lays down basic minimum standards 
for the treatment of refugees, without prejudice to states granting more 
favourable treatment. 
To be sure, there has been a gradual decline in the authority of the 1951 
Convention. National and regional jurisdiction has been applied to 
overcome some of the stipulations of the Convention in law; and where 
these cannot easily be overcome legally, Australia has not been alone in 
flouting the Convention to try to reshape it to contemporary settings. This 
decline means that standards are no longer applied consistently. 
Nevertheless, there is a strong argument that revising the Convention 
may jeopardise the rights, principles, and standards that it enshrines. In 
the current political climate, states would be inclined to negotiate a more 
restrictive Convention, rather than expanding the current refugee 
definition or reinforcing access to asylum systems for those arriving 
without authorisation. Opening up the Convention may also have 
implications for other treaties where the rights of refugees have their 
origins, for example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More 
prosaically, one of the great strengths of the 1951 Convention is its 
widespread ratification: it would likely take another half century to ratify a 
new Convention so completely. 
The time is not right to revise the 1951 Convention, although that time 
must come one day. For now, it should remain the cornerstone of 
refugee protection, and renewed efforts are required to defend its rights, 
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principles, and standards. Where reform is urgently required, however, is 
in its implementation, which is failing both states and refugees. 
FAILING STATES… 
One of the main concerns about the 1951 Convention from the point of 
view of states is the obligation it places on them to consider any 
application for asylum made on their territory, however ill-founded the 
application may be and even if the applicants enter without authorisation. 
In 2013, there were 1.2 million new asylum applications worldwide. 
Recent UNHCR estimates are for as many as 700 000 asylum claims in 
industrialised countries alone during 2014, a 24 per cent increase on the 
previous year’s total across these countries, and the highest in at least 
two decades.8 According to UNHCR statistics, in Australia asylum 
applications have also increased significantly over the last decade; 
although they have decreased over the last year. In the first six months 
of 2014, Australia received 4589 asylum applications; a 20 per cent 
decrease on the numbers over the same period in 2013.9 Of particular 
concern in the Australian context is the obligation to consider 
applications from people entering in an irregular manner — at the peak 
in 2013, there were between 3000 and 4000 illegal maritime arrivals 
each month in Australia. 
The scale of asylum seeking worldwide is compounded by the reality 
that a significant majority of those seeking asylum are found not to be 
legitimate refugees. Data on refugee status determination is hard to 
access and hard to interpret as in most countries there is a significant 
backlog between applying for asylum and receiving a final decision. But 
as an indicator, UNHCR reported that worldwide decisions were made 
on close to 700 000 asylum applications in 2012, of which 210 900 
(about 30 per cent) were recognised as refugees and a further 51 000 
given complementary forms of protection. Historically, Australia has 
granted refugee status to a higher proportion of asylum seekers than 
most other industrialised countries (although the proportion recognised 
as refugees varies considerably across nationalities). Furthermore, both 
Australia and European states have largely failed to deal with rejected 
asylum seekers. Returning them has significant financial, logistical, and 
political costs, and all too often rejected asylum seekers simply stay on 
to become irregular migrants. 
The main reason so many asylum seekers do not receive refugee status 
is that their claims are unfounded, at least as assessed against the 1951 
Convention definition. They are not facing persecution in the countries 
from which they arrive and, by and large, could safely be returned. The 
contemporary reality is that an increasing number of people are on the 
move for an increasing range of reasons, and the asylum channel 
provides one of the only legally-guaranteed channels to access the 
industrialised countries that are the target destinations for many migrants 
today. What is more, these ‘mixed migration’ flows, that see people 
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moving for broadly different motivations, have in many of the parts of the 
world come to be facilitated by people smugglers, who know full well that 
it is unlikely that asylum seekers will be returned, whatever the outcome 
of their asylum request. 
Another striking feature of statistics on refugee status determination is 
that outcomes vary significantly between countries, even for asylum 
seekers from the same origin country. This is because the 1951 
Convention is often interpreted and applied differently even by signatory 
states. In migration as well as other fields, national legislation is 
increasingly at odds with international law. Australia’s current Migration 
and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 is a good case in 
point. Its explanatory memorandum ensures  
…that the exercise of a range of powers cannot be invalidated 
because a court considers there has been a failure to…comply 
with Australia’s international obligations or the international 
obligations or domestic law of any other country.10 
The lack of any provisions or mechanism for ‘burden-sharing’ increasing 
asylum numbers between signatories is an additional concern for many 
of them. This means that more prosperous states, or those perceived as 
most generous, are generally the most targeted. It also means that it is 
asylum seekers (and the people smugglers they often pay), rather than 
destination countries, that determine where the asylum burden falls. In 
the European Union (EU), the Dublin Convention was designed to 
reduce this phenomenon of ‘asylum shopping’ by stipulating that asylum 
claims have to be processed in the first EU country where asylum 
seekers arrive; but people smugglers have found ways around this rule. 
While the 1951 Convention is widely ratified (and this is a powerful 
argument not to amend it), it is not universally ratified. India, for example, 
is a non-signatory. The obligations of the 1951 Convention that apply to 
signatories do not apply to non-signatories, the customary law provisions 
relating to ‘non-refoulement’ notwithstanding. This serves only to 
exacerbate the burden on signatories. It has been a particular challenge 
for Australia in recent years. Its standing as one of the few rich states 
that is also a signatory to the 1951 Convention in the Asia-Pacific region 
has helped make it a target for asylum seekers. 
For states there is one more glaring gap in the implementation of the 
1951 Convention, which is its ‘exilic bias’. That is, it places obligations on 
destination states that are increasingly onerous to fulfil; but none on the 
states that refugees are fleeing. Consider that Syria faces no legal 
censure for the displacement of millions of its citizens; but Turkey does if 
it fails to uphold the rights of just one. In this sense, the 1951 Convention 
is a reactive rather than proactive instrument: it provides protection after 
flight but does not address the initial causes for flight. The Convention 
does refer to durable solutions for refugees, one of which is voluntary 
repatriation, and, indeed, seeking solutions is part of the core mandate of 
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UNHCR. But there are no obligations on countries of origin concerning 
the rights of returnees. By definition once they cross the border back 
home they are no longer refugees. Yet it is very clear that, for many, 
return opens up a new set of challenges, from compensation and 
restitution, through reclaiming property and land, to finding employment; 
and the failure to resolve these challenges may lead to new exoduses 
and even the renewal of conflict.11 
…AND FAILING REFUGEES 
From a state perspective, then, implementing the 1951 Convention 
today presents significant challenges. But these also translate into 
failures for refugees too, some of which have already been alluded to. 
There are no obligations on states to address the conditions that cause 
refugees to flee their homes in the first place, and no obligations on their 
treatment after return other than to readmit them. The increasing 
prevalence of national legislation to reinterpret the 1951 Convention risks 
triggering a ‘race to the bottom’, where the ‘winner’ is the country that 
can interpret the Convention most restrictively, reducing its appeal for 
asylum seekers. As a result, asylum seekers are increasingly moving to 
signatory countries that do not have the capacity to assist and protect 
them; or to non-signatory countries, which are not formally obliged to 
assist them. In the EU context, asylum advocates have argued that the 
Dublin Convention has placed an unreasonable burden on poorer 
countries in the south and east of the EU, which are ill-equipped to cope, 
as illustrated by several recent reports on the rights and conditions of 
asylum seekers in Greece, for example.12 
Another important outcome of the current asylum regime is the uneven 
allocation of resources. Like data on refugee status determination, 
expenditures on asylum are also hard to access. It has been estimated 
that, in 1990, the European OECD states plus Canada were spending 
$US5 billion annually on the processing of refugee applications: ten 
times the UNHCR budget in that year. In 2000, it was reported that the 
United Kingdom spent more on asylum seekers ($US2.2 billion) than the 
total UNHCR budget of $US1.7 billion. Similarly in 2000, Australia spent 
as much on the Refugee Review Tribunal alone as it donated to 
UNHCR.13 These figures are dated, and in some cases the number of 
asylum seekers has dropped, but it is clear that industrialised states now 
spend far more money on their asylum systems, in many cases on 
people with unfounded claims to refugee status, than UNHCR spends to 
support the vastly more numerous and needy refugees in camps and 
cities in poorer countries around the world. While there were 1.2 million 
asylum seekers in 2013, there were 16.7 million refugees, and in total 
UNHCR reported over 50 million people of direct concern, including 
stateless people and internally displaced persons (IDPs).14 
Indeed the scale of contemporary displacement has already outgrown 
the provisions and assumptions of the 1951 Convention. Guaranteeing 
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refugee rights to such a large number of people, especially in poor 
countries, is becoming impossible. It has been argued that UNHCR has 
moved away from its primary task of protection to focus more on 
assistance.15 But even here it is failing. In a growing number of 
situations, UNHCR can do no more than provide shelter and basic 
support to refugees ‘warehoused’ for increasing periods of time in 
refugee camps. 
Another unintended consequence is the growth in people smuggling, 
which exposes migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, to risk and 
vulnerability.16 In just one week in February this year, over 300 migrants 
are reported to have drowned in the Mediterranean, and a further 3800 
were saved in just five days between 13 and 17 February.17 In 2013, it 
was estimated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) that 
3072 migrants drowned while trying to cross the Mediterranean, out of a 
total of 4077 who lost their lives during ‘fatal journeys’ worldwide.18 
These are crisis figures, and one of the main reasons for the crisis is that 
the international protection system is under increasing pressure and 
parts of it are failing.  
The 1951 Convention no longer provides protection for a sizeable 
proportion of those in need. Instead, it is increasingly a matter of who 
can pay, and one of its greatest beneficiaries is the people smuggling 
industry. Along the Mediterranean Sea route alone, some analysts 
estimate that smugglers extracted up to $US1 billion from migrants 
during the record high year of 2014.19 
TIME FOR A MORE SUSTAINABLE APPROACH 
It should not be surprising that a Convention drafted over 60 years ago, 
against a particular historical and geographical background, is no longer 
fully relevant. Both advocates and critics recognise the challenges 
associated with implementing the Convention today. Where they differ is 
in how to respond. 
UNHCR, the guardian of the 1951 Convention, has recognised the 
changing realities of displacement, as well as of state interests, and has 
continually adapted. While insisting that the 1951 Convention remains 
the cornerstone for refugee protection, largely because of concerns that 
its core principles may be renegotiated, it has, at the same time, 
demonstrated flexibility in filling some of the gaps. It has continually 
broadened its remit; for example, with a consistent focus on the rights of 
women (there is still a debate about whether the 1951 Convention 
definition covers gender-based violence) and children. In 2014, it put a 
particular emphasis on protection at sea.  
Outside its direct mandate and beyond the 1951 Convention, it has also 
supported innovative responses. It has worked to provide ‘protection in 
the region’, for example, via safe havens, to reduce the need for 
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refugees to travel long distances. It has acknowledged the value of 
supplementary forms of protection for people who do not satisfy the 
1951 Convention criteria but still would likely be at risk were they to 
return home. It is operational in non-signatory countries and among 
populations ‘of concern’ who may not directly fall within its mandate. It 
has contributed to the development of standards and principles on 
internal displacement, mixed migration, and environmental migration.20 It 
supports other parts of the UN system, as well as agencies outside the 
system, to try to provide more comprehensive responses. And it 
continues to cooperate with countries like Australia that have departed 
from the 1951 Convention, albeit not uncritically. 
To some commentators, UNHCR deserves credit for its adaptability. 
While the asylum and refugee regimes may be buckling under the 
current pressure of numbers, UNHCR continues to function, and, by and 
large, the rights of refugees continue to be respected and upheld. For 
others UNHCR risks betraying its core principles. Some of its 
compromises — for example, concerning protection in the region and 
supplementary forms of protection — have been criticised as reducing 
access for refugees to their rights. While new standards and principles 
have been effective — in particular the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement — they still do not provide legal protection or predictable 
assistance to vulnerable groups such as IDPs or those displaced by the 
effects of natural disasters or environmental change. The 1951 
Convention is no longer applied equally or consistently, and, for 
refugees, access to protection risks becoming a lottery. 
What is needed is an overhaul of the international protection system, to 
reduce its unpredictable and ad hoc nature, so it genuinely serves the 
interests of refugees and states. Australia, perhaps surprisingly, is well-
placed to launch this process. 
WHY AUSTRALIA? 
That Australia might lead on the reform of the international protection 
system that its signature brought into force 60 years ago (as the requisite 
sixth state to ratify it) bears a certain symbolic importance. But such a 
proposal will also generate disdain among some advocates given the 
Australian Government’s current policies on asylum. Why acknowledge, 
and even reward, deviancy? The answer is that Australia is not alone in 
addressing the shortcomings of the system with unilateral and tough 
responses, as witnessed, for example, by an increasingly hard line on 
boat arrivals in Europe.21 And there are sound arguments not only for 
Australia to take the lead, but also for the international community to let 
it. 
The most powerful reason for Australia to initiate reform is that it will, 
ultimately, result in a more effective asylum policy. Measured exclusively 
by the recent decline in boat arrivals, Australia’s current approach has 
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been a success. But even those closely involved in the policy are not 
confident that this outcome is sustainable. Fewer — but still some — 
boats continue to launch for Australia. At the moment, they are being 
intercepted. However, as in the Mediterranean, there has traditionally 
been a seasonal pattern to boat arrivals in Australia, and the ‘boat 
season’ is nearing. How long will the Government’s tactics manage to 
outwit those of the people smugglers? A fast boat that cannot be easily 
intercepted, a deliberate capsizing, or a mass launching that would 
stretch the current naval safety net, are genuine possibilities. As ‘ghost 
ships’ and armed responses in the Mediterranean in recent weeks 
demonstrate, people smugglers are both resourceful and determined. 
By most other measures the current approach can hardly be considered 
a success. It consumes significant resources and will continue to do so. 
It has strained relations between the executive and judiciary. It has 
similarly poisoned bilateral and regional alliances. And it has sullied 
Australia’s standing in the global community. Just as the political 
significance of asylum outweighs its numerical significance in Australian 
domestic politics, so too does Australia’s response risk having a 
disproportionate effect on its international reputation. However gung-ho 
some of Australia’s politicians may be, international opprobrium is bound 
to undermine Australia’s claims and ambitions to regional and 
international relevance and leadership.  
How long Canberra can bear these costs is an open question. A reform 
debate led by Australia should systematically address the current 
weaknesses in the asylum regime that have made Australia feel obliged 
to react with such force on asylum; and potentially remove the need for 
such extreme measures. If the discussion falters or reform fails, Australia 
can always revert to the current approach. Australia has little to lose and 
much to gain from advocating for reform. 
A second incentive for Australia to promote reform relates to the 
particularities of Australia’s asylum hinterland. Probably no other country 
is impacted more directly by the consequences of the stumbling 
international protection system. The often cited statement that there are 
no signatory countries lying between some of the main origin countries 
for asylum seekers in Australia (Afghanistan, Iran, Sri Lanka) and 
Australia itself is not quite true (Cambodia, China, Papua New Guinea, 
and the Philippines are all signatories to the 1951 Convention, as are 
some of the Pacific islands). However, it is true that none of the major 
transit countries for these asylum seekers — India, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Thailand — are signatories. Most analysts agree that being one of the 
few signatories in the region, combined of course with its wealth and 
living standards, is an important reason why asylum seekers come to 
Australia.22 But this should not be a reason for Australia to lower its 
standards to those of its neighbours. Rather it is a reason to shape a 
system that these neighbours would be willing and able to endorse and 
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implement, and to exercise regional leadership in achieving this goal and 
raising standards across the region. 
So much for Australia’s interest in reform: there may also be compelling 
reasons for the international community to accede to Australian 
leadership.  
One is Australia’s track record — internationally and domestically. 
Australia has been at the forefront of the debate on the Responsibility to 
Protect — justifying intervention to prevent the threat of mass atrocities. 
Australia has also pushed the idea of regional processing — enlisting 
other countries in the region to share the burden of asylum. Some of its 
asylum policies notwithstanding, Australia remains a champion of 
refugee resettlement, having recently upped its annual quota to 20 000, 
second only to the United States. Protecting people at home so they do 
not need to flee; promoting protection close to home so that they do not 
need to pay people smugglers to reach safety; and unlocking durable 
solutions for refugees are all key components of a better international 
protection system. 
In contrast to most European countries, there are also good grounds to 
believe that the Australian Government would receive strong domestic 
support for leading a reform agenda. In recent years, the leaders of both 
main political parties, as well as the Greens, have proposed reforms to 
the 1951 Convention. They may differ in their focus and their proposals, 
but there seems to be political consensus that reform is in Australia’s 
interests. The 1951 Convention is often described as a ‘European’ 
Convention, and neither political nor public support for a serious 
overhaul of its implementation is likely in Europe, despite growing 
asylum pressures there. 
A COMMITMENT TO CHANGE 
What should a review of the international protection system look like? 
Any review should be outcome-oriented. This is a necessary prerequisite 
not just because the international protection system is no longer working; 
but also because many states would probably not participate in another 
global process that offers little prospect of achieving what cannot already 
be achieved through national legislation and policy.  
What is not needed therefore is a replay of UNHCR’s ‘global 
consultations’ through 2001 and 2002 to mark the 50th anniversary of the 
1951 Convention, which unanimously reaffirmed the commitment of the 
international community to the Convention and culminated with an 
‘Agenda for Protection’ adopted by the General Assembly in 2002.23 
What is needed is a commitment to change that confronts the 
weaknesses of the international protection system, including the 1951 
Convention, that reinforces the benefits that can accrue from reform; and 
that highlights the likely consequences of continued failure. Few states 
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today would disagree with Australia that the system no longer serves 
their national interests; many would prefer not to abrogate international 
responsibilities in order to protect them. 
The preceding discussion has already highlighted some of the outcomes 
that a review should aim for. Paramount should be the rights of refugees 
— reinforcing the ‘timeless values’ of the 1951 Convention. Ultimately, 
states are the guarantors of these rights, and so a review should need to 
respond to the growing concerns of states, in particular around the 
burden and inequities of the asylum system.  
First, an international protection system fit for purpose in the twenty-first 
century should strive for accountability and impose sanctions on states 
that cause displacement.24 The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ paradigm 
paves the way, although its application is uneven. Equally, it should pay 
more serious attention to addressing other factors that compound 
refugee flight, from a lack of development through to climate change. 
International attention this year on financing for development, the 
Sustainable Development Goals, and moving forward climate change 
negotiations are all opportunities in this direction: in each case 
displacement can be mainstreamed. 
Second, it should seek to reduce the need for long-distance asylum 
seeking. At the moment too many asylum seekers — including genuine 
refugees — are taking too many risks to travel long distances to reach 
asylum. It is these journeys that generate business for people 
smugglers, who arrange transportation, help overcome immigration rules 
and procedures, and often also insert people in the countries where they 
go — all illegally, and all heightening the vulnerability of asylum seekers. 
A more systematic response to protecting and assisting people 
displaced within their own countries would be one way to anchor them 
close to their places of origin. This would entail strengthening adherence 
to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, but also extending 
existing policies such as ‘safe havens’ that have already been tested in 
countries such as Iraq. Better regional protection mechanisms, as 
currently being promoted by the Australian Government, should also 
reduce the incentive to travel distantly. Again, this is not a new proposal. 
Development assistance should also target neighbouring asylum 
countries, to reduce the growing trend of secondary migration, whereby 
people leave refugee camps for onward journeys. All of these proposals 
are achievable and Australia already has a strong track record on them. 
What is more they should strengthen the current global policy emphasis 
on combatting people smuggling and trafficking.  
Third, a renewed international protection system should also reduce the 
asylum burden on destination countries; for example by conceiving a 
form of burden sharing, streamlining criteria for refugee status 
determination, and implementing robust offshore and transit processing. 
Moving through the ‘refugee cycle’ (indeed, getting the refugee cycle 
…an international 
protection system fit for 
purpose in the twenty-
first century should strive 
for accountability and 
impose sanctions on 
states that cause 
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moving again), the return of rejected asylum seekers would need to be 
facilitated, for example, by imposing obligations on countries of origin. 
Undoubtedly these are challenging policy goals. On what basis should 
burden sharing take place (national population size and characteristics 
and national income are often suggested)? Addressing root causes is a 
long-term challenge and states have short-term goals in this arena. 
Applying the Responsibility to Protect, protecting IDPs, and returning 
rejected asylum seekers all intersect with the principles of national 
sovereignty. But many such proposals have already been considered in 
detail by experts. The conceptual and legal groundwork is in place.25 
To be taken seriously, any review should also consider funding and 
institutional responsibilities. In particular the mandate of UNHCR should 
be part of a review. A sensible balance would need to be struck in 
designing the scope of the review: sufficient to achieve concrete 
outcomes, but targeted enough not to engage in ‘mission creep’ or 
become unwieldy. Certainly there are wider issues that might be 
considered; for example, the relationship between UNHCR and other UN 
agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 
responding to ‘mixed migration’ and people smuggling. Another is the 
intersection between UNHCR and other institutions dealing with issues 
that impact the causes of displacement such as trade, investment, 
development cooperation, security, and international politics.26 In some 
circumstances, for example, environmental migration, it has been 
suggested that UNHCR may be best placed to mobilise action at the 
international level rather than assume direct responsibility.27 In others, it 
may be required to extend — or limit — its mandate. 
This, is in, turn leads to discussion regarding another key parameter for 
any review process, which is ownership. In particular, there is a strong 
argument that the review should not become the responsibility of 
UNHCR. The agency’s vested interests against change are probably too 
significant to overcome. Instead, this should be a state-led process, 
including, where possible, non-signatories to the Convention. The 
requirement for consultation is clear, and certainly should include the UN 
agencies and NGOs and asylum and refugee representatives. The 
private sector should be an important addition, as it has become a much 
more significant actor both in the international protection system and in 
global governance more widely.28  
AUSTRALIA AND THE 1951 CONVENTION 
This Analysis has argued that the international protection system is 
failing. Much more controversially, it has suggested that Australia may 
be well-placed to lead a review of the system. 
This is not to excuse or apologise for Australia’s current asylum policy. 
To be clear: Australia has reneged on its international commitments. The 
practice of undertaking cursory interviews of asylum seekers on board 
Australia has reneged  
on its international 
commitments. 
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ships does not meet the international standard that requires asylum 
seekers to have access to legal advice and representation.29 Australia 
has not extended its human rights guarantees to asylum seekers 
transferred to other countries as is required by the 1951 Convention to 
which it is a signatory.30 And according to the United Nations Human 
Rights Council, in 2013, Australia violated the International Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by detaining asylum seekers 
arbitrarily, failing to provide an effective judicial remedy, and subjecting 
detainees to conditions of detention that are “…cumulatively inflicting 
serious psychological harm upon them.”31  
A final reason for Australia to propose reform of the international 
protection system is that soon it will lose the credibility to do so. The 
instigator of a debate usually gets to set the agenda and the terms for 
the debate. Australia’s current policies may drive either UNHCR or other 
signatory states to review the international protection system 
themselves, in which scenario rather than having its finger on the trigger 
of reform, Australia would be in its crosshairs. 
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